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Since the New Order era mining policy is strongly tended to be political for the fact that this 
sector is highly promising. The case on Clear and Clean mechanism was full of potency on rent-
seeking with the modus of various regulation misuse. Every spot of rent-seeking in this case has 
provided different opportunity of manipulation. The  Clear and Clean case also shown about the 
strength of central government against local government. The local government was considered as the 
party that resembles the business owner so it was their duty to save the asset. The strength of patron-
client in clear and clean policy was mainly proven by the fact of the appearance of Individual triangle 
alliance as a broker. This also explained that woman and paranormal as third person was strongly very 
influential in lobbying between the  interest business owners and bureucrates. The result of research 
also reconfirmed about the strength of patron-client model. This model was indicated by the existance 
of strength informal actors that penetrated the environment of formal  bureaucracy. Strength of those 
informal actors was the main key of access business owner in the rent-seeking network and circle in 
different spots. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The research is aimed to thoroughly unwrap Indoneasian coal mining policy in political 
economic perspective. As it is well known mining sector is one of prominent sector in Indonesia to 
contribute the economic growth. Since the New Order era mining policy is strongly tended to be 
political for the fact that this sector is highly promising. The specific clear and clean was proposed in 
2010 to answer the need of a more transparent coal mining permit. 
The case on Clear and Clean mechanism was full of potency on rent-seeking with the modus of 
various regulation misuse. Every spot of rent-seeking in this case has provided different opportunity of 
manipulation. The most important part of this formulation process was the point of  “cost of” process. 
The case of Clear and Clean has shown about the different pattern thar resembles the points of  
potency on rent-seeking.This potency of rent-seeking was dominated by policy actors from central 
government through manipulation of regulation 
This caused the harmful situation where the certification Clear and Clean process become an 
alternative  instrument to eliminate the non-Clear and Clean Local Mining Permit (IUP) and provide a 
new arena of rent-seeking. The policy actors from central government then developed the new blok as 
central government mining permit (PKP2B). This highly cost of rent-seeking has not only caused an 
expensive cost of policy making process with fee transaction, but also it provided another tremendous 
social impact. 
The case of eliminating  Local Mining Permit (IUP) and make a new central government mining 
permit (PKP2B) in Pinang Jatus for example, has caused a mismanagenment of indegenous land 
concession called Tanah Adat Adji Panembahan Lambakan and emerged the significantly severe 
negative externality. In the context of negative  externality, central government almost has cancelled 
the policy on Clear and Clean. Ministry Energy and Mineral Source (ESDM) will evaluate against 
Clear and Clean certificate that have been issued. While the Law of Minerba has been issued with Law 
Number 4 Year 2009, central government have the authority to remanage the permit. For this fact, 
central government through Directorate General of mineral and Coal has sociallized a program in 
managing through  reconciliating and updating data of IUP by local government. 
Several number of researches have explained the aspects of political economy with  wider 
perspective. Those researches simply tried in revealing the rent-seeking activity in coal mining 
subsector. The importance of authority in specific regulation will answer the research question gap 
that has left by the previous researches. Some results have been reported from previous researches in 
explaining rent-seeking approach by Krueger (1974), Khan and Jomo (2000), Little (2002), and 
Rachbini (2012). Another researches were made to answer in more specific way about  authority in 
rent-seeking process as reported by  Jomo & Gomez (2000), Amsden (1989), Chang (1994), and Kim 
& Ma (1997). The forther research on institution of  rent-seeking actors and policy regulation were 
explained by Robinson & Torvik (2008), Tan (2008), Naritomi & Soares (2007), and Ballard (2002).  
The specific research on similar Clear and Clean certification were focusing on the policy actors 
in different level of central and local government. This explained how activity of rent-seeking that 
were carried out and provide conflict of interest and  role central or level as were reported  by Wick & 
Butle (2006), Yasmi (2006), Evaquarta (2008), Kirana  Jaya (2004), and Budiyanto (2002). 
Meanwhile, the study on impact and pattern of rent-seeking were recently reported by Khan and Jomo 
(2000), Ross (2002), Khan & Jomo (2000),  and Mohammad & Whalley (1983). Their research have  
shown about the impact of policy in negating the public value. Research on rent-seeking  in policy has 
provided a gap about the actor relation in rent-seeking practice in mining coal policy both central or 
local government. 
RESEARCH METHODE 
This study uses qualitative methods with a non–positivist approach through  explorative case 
studies. Analysis delivered with theory of rent-seeking toward the Clear and Clean Certification as one 
of regulation on mining coal.  Theory of rent seeking by Khan (2000) has explained that practice of 
rent seekingis related to the expenditure of some resources including the aspects on efforts of creating, 
distributing, transfer and maintaining the rent. Those efforts were delivered to fulfill the interests in 
obtaining a privilege from government in pursuing certain access to the policy makers on policy
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making process (Parker, 2011). Network of rent-seeking in permit regulation mining coal was 
analysed through variables of regulation, actors, and institutions.  
To complete the explanation theory on the rent-seeking this research has used the  Laswell and 
Mills theory to narrate the relationship of  inter-actors in every single case of  rent-seeking ass critical 
development of the idea of Charles Lindblom about  rational actor. Relation of actors will not always 
act in rational of the interest of the  actor. Explanation of Laswell and Mills become important that 
practice of rents seeking is considered always based on transactional practice. Model of patron client is 
used to analyze the relation of elites and role as superior member (patron) and inferior member 
(client). 
Analysis of superior and inferior member is used to see deeply  the character and mechanism of 
interest elites so that the rent-seeking phenomena while seeing the local characters in Indonesia, such 
as the existance of paranormal as a part of policy maker. The use of patron-client model is related with 
the results of studies by Little (2002) that stated whether the form of  rent-seeking in most of Southeast 
countries are corruption and patron-client. Analysis on role actor in rent-seeking permit is the further 
effort in analyzing process of rent seeking spots on permit regulation of mining coal that is explained 
in the preface. The disussion is based on the process  and  actors, regulation, and also pattern of  rent-
seeking emphasized by Khan and Jomo (2000) that stated patron-client was focus on corruption, 
transfer, and intervention. The discussion also includes the arguments on Elites Theory. Theory of 
Laswell is used as the basic inexplained how the political elites may produce such authoritative 
decisions that influenced widely in most of society life (Parsons, 2008).  
Empirically it is also explained by the results of previous research as confirmation on the role of 
actors in coal mining policy. Role of  actors and contestation of  rent-seeking possess a certain 
character as main of the research result and novelty of it. The research of this paper also confirmed the 
theory by Wright C. Mills that an output of policy is strongly determined by the elites entity that 
dominate the higher position on an oganization. In this context, it is represented by the mining 
corporation and bureaucacy structure. Case in this research has shown that elites policy maker and 
business people were indeed the epicentrum of rent-seeking on coal mining business.  
The analysis against variable and indicator research in practice mafia rent seeking policy mining 
coal is policy variable or regulation with indicator inconsistent policy, manipulation policy, and gap 
regulation utilization. Variable of institution have dynamic indicator institution, role institution and the 
coorporation among the corporations as indicator of the weakness of governance. The variable of  
actor policy is measured by indicator of the third person, the role of bureaucrate and how the business 
persons influence the policy. This variable is measured to underline the indicator weaknesses of the 
leader or policy maker. For the respondents protection needs, the author uses a pseudonym in 
explaining the case in the study. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Rent-Seeking on Certification of Clear and Clean Regalulation 
Regulation became a potency of rent-seekingfor its tendency for the policy actors to mismanage 
the process of policy making process and later misuse  the implementation.  The regulation 
manipulation in this case merely the regulation abouse in which the permit administration process 
certification Clear and Clean was taken place.  Considering that the restriction on terminology of rent-
seeking as a certain effort in fulfilling an interest to obtain privelege from government in special 
access towards and policy formulation (Parker, 2011), so this case is very relevant. The case Clear and 
Clean was focus on the regulation gap on permit administration process in Clear and Clean 
certification. This very process was used by those business owners to save their poblematic IUP. The 
problematic certification of Clear and Clean was caused by careless administration that published the 
permit without technical field assessment. Furthermore this provided a new arena for rent-seeking 
among the mining business owners. 
The need of business owner against certification Clear and Clean as term of condition on coal 
exporting has been causing a small chaos. The  regulation of Clear and Clean was extremely hunted by 
those business owners. This policy maker atmosphere become very exclusive. They are so hard to 
find, so difficult to access and almost impossible to penetrated for its very strict mechanism  in 
accessing the central of policy makers. The brokers in this sector become more careful and will 
strongly research and screen for any parties who want to access this elites group. 
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The urgency and strategic value of Clear and Clean certificate was emerged in the periode of 
booming coal in 2009 until  2014. All of the IUP permit  holders tried so hard to pursuit the 
administration process of Clear and Clean certification. Their approach to the bureaucracy  were done 
to obtain the permit for non-Clear and Clean  IUP . That was urgent because some of those companies 
have not passed the process yet but the have already signed the payment  contract with foreign buyers 
fo export to China, India, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. That is no wonder that during the period of 
2009-2014 all of efforts were delivered to obtain the certification of Clear and Clean. Since it was 
important for coal mining industry in Indonesia those business owners will  do anything, at all cost. 
Clear and Clean Certification Without Field Assessment 
One of case of Clear and Clean is permit administration process certification done by PT. Crgl 
Indonesia. The meeting between the actors of rent-seeking in Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resource was done between Mr. H, one of the directors of PT. Crgl Indonesia as a company on trading 
coal. The permit administration on process of certification was introduced through the assistance of 
one of the  highly officials of  first echelon (Mr. PP) in Ministry of  Transportation of  Republik 
Indonesia. Mr. PP has introduced Mr. H with another highly official of  Third echelon in Ministry 
EDSM namely Mrs. D.  
The meeting between Mrs. D and was organized in a venue near the office of Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resource Republik Indonesia. In the meeting Mr. H was accompanied by Mr. PP 
and his wife. The wife is Mrs. NN in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource Mrs. NN is well 
known as  LL, a lobbyist and also paranormal to access the policy maker circostance. The discussion 
with Mrs. D was direct to the topic of Clear and Clean matter.  
This was because the client is considered trustful that well known by the third person. In this 
occasion Mr. D stated that the key person in the errand of  Clear and Clean certification is Mr. Fdl. As 
explained by Mrs. D, Fdl is a highly officials of  fourth echelon in Law Bureau Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resource. His position is a key to access Clear and Clean certification. One of the intersenting 
point is the discussion is about the rate to provide a technical map. This very map is needed to defend 
for an overlapping question. The purpose for mining should not be overlapped with othe purpose 
especially forestry. This technical map can be printed for clients and each costs 25 million IDR as a 
dowry.  
The amount of total rate to process certification Clear and Clean vary depends on the case Clear 
and Clean. Maximum rate as stated by Mrs. D is 500 million IDR. Mrs. D added the explanation about 
the term and condition in obtaining certification on Clear and Clean. The most important condition is 
the fulfilling payment of any tax. Even if it would be found an overlapping purpose on the spot of 
misning, as long as all tax is paid the  Clear and Clean certificate will be issued.  
So far Mr. H  always ask the advisory of Mr. PP in term of acessing permit administration 
process for  Clear and Clean certificate in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. This was merely 
because Mr. H has good relationship with Mr. PP since he obtained the administration process on 
permit of harbor in coal mining freight belongs to PT. Crgl. In that time Mr. PP arranged the lobby and 
meeting between Mr.  H and  Mrs. D in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. The meeting was 
facilitated by his wife as usual. NN is the second wife of Mr. PP who possessing a wide range network 
of lobbying in among bureaucracy in several Ministry. 
The case  of Clear and Clean also emerged the name of policy actor of  Mr. RO as Director of  
PT TIC and the third persons around him, The actor of IS is the most prominent middle man belongs 
to RO. IS is well known as a middle man with the strong ability to  access inside of the  labyrinth of 
rent-seeking in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. In this very processof Clear and Clean 
certificate IS also worked intensly with Mr.Fdl from Law Bureau of Mining and Energy and Mineral 
Resource. After the consultation Mr.Fdl suggested the middle person and team firstly to make 
payment of the unpaid tax of PNPB. The PNPB payment were including (1) regularly Land Rent and 
(2) royalty payment if the company had produced  coal, and (3) other unpaid tax. After the payment 
are accomplished Mr. Fdl continued the permit administration processon  Clear and Clean certificate. 
As experienced by PT. TIC, the cost of permit administration process Clear and Clean 
certificate was about  200 million IDR per IUP. This amount is way smaller the the regular rate in 
general. It was stated by IS that he is get used to have deal with Mr.Fdl in processing IUP using 
informal way (special lane). In this context Mr.Fdl is very responsive in helping IS. He made all of the 
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administration file and letters. All af the errand was well done  by actively visiting the hotel where the 
IS and team stay in Jakarta. All of the detailed job description was done all-in worth with the big 
compensation he has gained. 
The role of IS as the third person of PT. TIC has shown the domination of misuse of  regulation. 
When PT. TIC has effort for registration  of their 7 IUP blok, IS received a formal letter made by 
Mr.Fdl from The Bureau of Law in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. This letter should 
we followed up by Local Office of Mining  bureau of The district of Kutai Kartanegara. Later on the 
Head of local office (Mr.Dna) sent the formal confirmation about the letter to the central ministry. 
After receiving confirmation the the seven  blok has been registered and received certificate of Clear 
and Clean soon, the new  IUP of PT.TIC  were announced as a IUP with Clear and Clean status. This 
is publisehed lately even that the registration deadline was closed.  
In the context of local government, District leader Kutai Timur, Mr.Isran Noor, has stated it 
publicly about the transaction in Clear and Clean certification among the mining companies  (Kompas, 
27 November 2014).Certification of Clear and Clean does not have basis of law for the certification 
was not wentioned in the regulation of environmental analysis (AMDAL). According to him the 
certification of  Clear and Clean will only be the transactional commodity  in Ministry of Mining and 
Energy and Mineral Resource. This was even mentioned in front of several  highly official of local 
government office  in Kalimantan. Interestingly, the statement was denied by the Director General 
Coal and Mineral of Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource, Sukhyar. He denied what has accused 
by  Isran  about that transactional certification. According to Sukhyar since the very beginning the 
Minstry of Mining and Energy and Mineral Resource has a good intention to have better  management 
permit on mining sector. 
Other experience on permit administration process of  Clear and Clean was narrated by Mr. 
SBC, the Director of PT.HG, the holding company of giant property business in Indonesia. Mr. SBC 
has some IUP in Palangkaraya Central of Kalimantan Province and some other  IUP in Berau, East 
Kalimantan Province. The companies of Mr. SBC also have the  certification of Clear and Clean 
through entry access in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. Mr. SBC made use of the advisory 
of a  highly official of  first echelon, Mr. WK. This actor name of  Rus as middle man as the courrier 
were hired, Rus is the nephew of WK. Mostly the role of Rus is as the professional arranger in 
obtaining permit in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. Through his beloved uncle he become 
famous and considered important among the Ministry of Mining and Energy and Mineral Resource.  
For Mr. SBC, Rus is trustful with the longer experince of work in process permit in Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resource. For every single permit administration process certification the 
compensation was given by SBC for all in 300 million IDR per IUP. By receiving the compensation, 
Rus and his tim would prepare all the file needed for the certification, and PT. HG has to only prepare 
for the payment.  
Another experience in permit administration process of Clear and Clean certificate was reported 
by the  Director of  PT PEN, Mr. UZ. He had IUP underground type in the District of Banjar south of 
Kalimantan. Technically  the coal mining using underground method have no regulation made by 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource because  Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource, They 
only regulated  and legalized the conventional or open pit mining. But since the business owner has a 
close relationship with the highly official of  first echelon in ESDM (Mr.DS) the regulation can be 
managed. The highly official of Mr. DS and Mr. UZ has worked together before with the owner of 
foreign coal mining underground in Hanbing Province, China. The director of the company, Mr. Yung 
worked the mining with, Mr. UZ through a certain contract with Directorate General of Mineral and 
Coal Ministry of Mining and Energy to make an additional regulation of coal mining underground in 
Indonesia.  
The explanatoion above has confirmed that actors of rent-seeking in the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resource consist of highly officials in various background. They are the high officials of  
fourth echelon until first echelon. this reffered to the situation that a certain relation has been strongly  
developed between  bureaucrate in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource with the business 
owners. Some of those highly officials in the first echelon level were even possessing another position 
in the company of the mining business. Some of those local bureaucrate has possesed the positiom in 
the Board of Commissioner in the mining company. Most of the time those bureaucrate use the name 
of family or relatives to hide the identity.  
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In there of the deadline of KP and IUP  registration from Directorate General of Mineral and 
Coal Ministry of Mining and Energy, it has been announced thet the registration was closed  by  June 
in 2011. It has been socialized through The Agent  of Energy and Mineral Resource in 
district/municipal level. In case some IUP or KP has not been registered after the date, the process will 
not be able to continue to the next level of Clear and Clean process. The inconsistent policy can also 
be seen in the case on Clear and Clean. The registration process can be arranged by a certain line. In 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. The special mechanism was organized through Directorate 
General of Mineral and Coal. Even that the due date of registration has been expired. Few of local 
office or  Agent of Mining and Energy and Mineral Resource of districts was not be able to access 
registration because in the same time the Commission of Corruption Erradication has penetrated the 
office supervising the Bureau of Mining and Energy that provide coal mining permit in East 
Kalimantan Province . 
Emphasizing the rent-seeking mechanism was organized by assessing regulation policy on data 
manipulation, misuse of regulation gap, and implementation of inconsistent policy. The result of  
analysis of the Clear and Clean is as follow. 
Table 1. Analysis on Rent-Seeking Practice in Certification of Clear and Clean 





Some company (in 2012, there were  51,96 %  from total company coal 
mining) considered  clear and clean.  Actually they were pseudo- clear and 
clean 
Without field assessment and administration. 
Misuse of  regulation 
gap 
IUP holders can monitor themself against the process regulation in 
Directorate General of Mineral and Coal. 
This should be the job of technical agent in local government to be 
responsible. The access of IUP holders was used to obtain privilege in the 
process certification clear and clean. 
Inconsistent policy Mining of underground cathegory have no regulation to operate yet. The 
mining policy in Indonesia has only regulated the  open pit coal mining type. 
But still the underground mining was certified with clear and clean. 
Policy on clear and clean has caused the conflict of interests between local 
and central goverment. Mechanism and procedural stages was organized 
without field visit as instrumen of monopoli (PKP2B) and inconsistent with 
the Law of Minerba about the decentralization of IUP  
       Source: Analysis data primer (2016) 
Certification Clear and Clean: New Arena of Rent-Seeking. 
The case of Clear and Clean was the strong evidence on how the regulation gap was obviously 
used to pursuit an individual or group interest of rent-seeking. The fee transaction in the proses of 
certification Clear and Clean was developed through the third person/courriers. Thet represent part of 
the rent-seeking network in permit administration process in Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resource. The amount of transaction was quite significantly big.  
The payment of 700 million IDR was received from PT TIC and another 300 million IDR from 
PT. HG. Another amount was  500 million IDR from PT Crgl Indonesia. The similar modus was done 
in manipulating regulation by paying the unpaid tax (PNPB) before the company continuing the 
process of issuing their certification of Clear and Clean. As mentioned before, the process was assisted 
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Table 2. Rent-Seeking Potency on Certification of Clear and Clean 
Case Analysis rent-seeking 
Rent-extraction certification 
clear and clean for 
evaluation based on Decree 
of Directorate General of 
Mineral and Coal Number. 
1406/30/DJB/2012 on date 
30 april 2012 
New arena of rent-seeking and bribing, with no field assessment 
 
 
Rent-creation as bribing in 
permit administration 
process certification clear 
and clean 
PT. HG has obtained permit administration process clear and 
clean directly to the highly official of first echelon of ESDM 
(WK). Transaction of  Mr. SBC through  Rus for 300 million 
IDR bribing via paranormal Mr. SL. 
PT TIC (Mr. RO) commiting transaction for permit 
administration process Clear and Clean through courier IS to Mr. 
Fdl (Law of Bureau ESDM) with amount of 1,4 M IDR for 7 
IUP. 
PT Crgl Indonesia has accomplished payment of transaction 
through courier Mrs NN with total amount of 500 million IDR 
Rent-seizing: Manipulation 
on the number of clear and 
clean certification 
51,96% of the companies without Clear and Clean in 2012. 
Instrument of monopoly 
(PKP2B Permit) 
Policy clear and clean and authirity conflict of interest in term of 
Minerba Law. 
Rent-extraction clear and 
clean underground mining 
No regulation for specific coal  mining of underground. 
Government only regulates open pit mining, Certification clear 
and clean was issued for underground mining after highly 
official of  first echelon Ministry of Mining and Energy and 
Mineral Resource  was hired as commisioner. 
          Source: Analized primary data (2016) 
 
The Clear and Clean case also shown about the strength of central government against local 
government. The local government was considered as the party that resembles the business owner so it 
was their duty to save the asset. The strength of patron-client in East Kalimantan Province was mainly 
proven by the fact of the appearance of Individual triangle alliance as a broker. 
Meanwhile the the name of Rus also has appeared so frequently as informing that Rus is a very 
close relative of the highly official of  first echelon in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource when 
this research was taken. Another frequent appearance was the name of Mrs. NN in Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resource. This also explained that women as third person was strongly very influential in 
lobbying between the  interest business owner of Mr.H, one of PT Crgl Indonesia director and dan 
Mrs. D, a bureaucrate in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. This also reconfirmed the strength 
of patron-client model. This model was indicated by the existance of strength informal actors that 
penetrated the environment of formal  bureaucracy. Strength of those informal actors was the main key 
of access business owner in the rent-seeking network and circle in different spots. 
The case of Clear and Clean also intoduced the character of  paranormal SL from the district 
Tegal  in Central Java. He is a trustful and prominent paranormal belongs to WK, the highly official of  
first echelon in Ministry of Mining and Energy and Mineral Resource. The existance of this figure 
resembles the similar pattern of the existance of certain character in the informal structure that may 
intefere the political atmosphere of formal bureaucracy as harmful  indicator of patron-client (Harris-
White, 2001). In that study of research Harris–White stated that  the role of paranormal was very 
specific with the task and duty as the first layer  to fully safe the othe formal actors on mining coal 
business players. In this case, SL was the paranormal who will testify the credibility and safety of the 
clients. Those who are willing to meet WK should meet SL paranormal for a basic screening for his 
 Political economy perspective of mining policy: a case study on rent seeking in clear and clean  regulation of coal 
mining in indonesia (2009-2014); 
Bambang Arwanto 
Copyright © 2018, JURNAL MANAJEMEN ISSN Print: 0285-6911 ISSN Online: 2528-1518 
  104 
ability with another frequent appearance was the name of Mrs. NN in Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resource. This also duty on being paranormal. 
CONCLUTION   
The Clear and Clean case has shown about the dynamic and strength between central 
government against local government. The local government was considered as the party that 
resembles the business owner so it was their duty to save the asset. The strength of patron-client in 
east Kalimantan Province was mainly proven by the fact of the appearance of several names of the 
third persond. These middle persons appear as 3Ps namely middle persons, women lobbyist and 
paranormal (perantara-perempuan-paranormal ). 
The name of the 3Ps have also  appeared in other cases beside the Clear and Clean namely Rus 
and IS. The frequent appearance was the name of women lobbyist namely Mrs. D and  Mrs. NN in 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource. This also explained that women third person was strongly 
very influential in lobbying between the  interest business owners and bureaucrates. In the specific 
case of Clear and Clean the main actor was  Mr. H from PT Crgl Indonesia, Mrs. D, and DS a 
bureaucrate in Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource of Republik Indonesia. 
Result of research  in Clear and Clean case also reconfirmed about  the strength of patron-client 
model. This model was indicated by the existance of strength informal actorts that penetrated the 
environment of formal  bureaucracy. Strength of those informal actors was the main key of access 
business owner in the rent-seeking network and circle in different spots of coal mining rent- seeking 
activity. 
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